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Abstract  
 
COMARU (Consejo Machiguenga del Río Urubamba) is an indigenous organization that 
promotes the rights of thirty native Amazonian communities in the face of the Camisea Project, a 
massive natural gas extraction project. The state has consistently ignored negative health, 
environmental, and cultural impacts from five spills that have occurred in the natural gas 
pipeline, and the communities the right of consultation granted to them in the International Labor 
Organization’s Convention 169. This paper, using interviews with Machiguenga community 
members and COMARU leadership in addition to political ecology scholarship, analyzes the 
success of COMARU’s politicized and depoliticized strategies. Through the use of four criteria, 
it determines that while the organization needs to make several changes to how it operates as a 
change agent, it is generally successful due to its ability to navigate unequal power structures 
within Peru and genuinely listen to the voices of the communities.  
 
 
Introduction  
 
 In a school building in the Amazonian community of Shimaa, I sit at a table observing a 
meeting between the community’s teacher, health promoter, community members and two 
leaders of COMARU. On the wall is a sign that reads, “Respecting ourselves we will live better.” 
Just outside of the school is a traditional Machiguenga hut with a roof constructed of leaves, 
whereas the school in which we sat was made of concrete. This is because it was constructed as 
compensation by TGP, the company that constructed a natural gas pipeline directly through 
Shimaa. The pipeline is within walking distance from the school.   Alfredo, the community 
health promoter, stands up to give his account of the current health maladies in the community: 
parasites, uterine cancer, boils, all due to water contamination from ruptures in the pipeline that 
leads through the community. He insists that the state should at least provide a health post 
stocked with medical supplies for the community. Alfredo currently has to zipline out of the 
community to Kepashiato, where he buys medicine for the community with his own money. 
COMARU listens intently and takes notes.  
  In the Southeast Peruvian Amazon, natural gas extraction through the Camisea Project is 
having incredibly adverse health, environmental, and cultural impacts on native Machiguenga 
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communities (Earle 2009; Vences 2006; Bruijn 2010). A traditionally silenced population, 
Machiguengas have suffered these consequences despite the promises of the Peruvian state to 
involve them in decision-making and to make sure they, too, benefit from the extraction. 
COMARU (Consejo Machiguenga del Río Urubamba) is an organization entirely composed of 
Machiguengas that works intimately with thirty Machiguenga communities to promote their 
rights in the face of the project.  In this paper, using a political ecology framework, I will analyze 
the success of COMARU (Consejo Machiguenga del Río Urubamba) using four criteria of 
success: achieving legitimate representation of the communities, fostering of a collective 
Machiguenga identity which is necessary for a powerful mobilization, achieving adequate 
compensation and attention through negotiations with the state and energy companies, and 
holding the state accountable for laws that protect indigenous rights through politicized tactics 
such as strikes and protests.  
 While COMARU was originally established as a representative organization, conveying 
the needs of the communities to external powerholders who have the finances to implement 
development projects, elevated threats from the Camisea Project have prompted COMARU to 
transform itself into a social movement organization. COMARU now uses politicized tactics 
such as strikes and roadblocks to jolt the state into fulfilling its promises of indigenous 
consultation and compensation. First, I will provide background information on the Camisea 
Project and Machiguengas. Additionally, I will a political ecological framework that informs the 
case study in order to clarify the power structure COMARU navigates in order to function as a 
social movement organization. After I discuss the adverse impacts reported to me through 
interviews with Machiguenga community members and leaders of COMARU, I will analyze the 
success of COMARU using my four criteria of success previously mentioned. Finally, in my 
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conclusion, I will make recommendations for the organization. This research is important 
because it sheds light on voices of Amazonian communities that are traditionally marginalized.  
Additionally, it provides a case study of an organization that, for the most part, successfully 
navigates unequal power dynamics between the communities, state, energy companies and 
international NGO’s to achieve substantial change in the communities and capture the world’s 
attention.     
 
Methodology 
 
 This research was carried out partly through ethnographic interviews with leaders of 
COMARU at their office in Quillabamba, Peru, where I interviewed them about the philosophy 
of the organization and their perceptions of the Camisea Project. I also traveled with several 
COMARU leaders to five communities impacted by the Camisea Project in Alto Urubamba: 
Korimani, Chakopishiato, Inkaare, Monte Carmelo and Shimaa. There, I gathered ethnographic 
interviews from community leaders, and a few community members.  
 In each community, I observed meetings between leaders of COMARU and community 
members where they discussed impacts of the Camisea Project in addition to other inter-
community conflicts. I also include observations from an anniversary party of COMARU, where 
I observed Machiguengas celebrate their culture through singing and dancing.  Apart from field 
work, I relied on research from political ecology scholars to understand how COMARU 
functions within a power web in order to fight for change. 
 It is important to note that my position as a white American woman brings with it 
inherent biases in how I envision indigenous organization and development. However, I hope 
that my unique opportunity to travel with COMARU will provide a unique perspective of the 
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inner-workings of the organization and contribute to pre-existing critiques of their 
efficaciousness.  
Theoretical Framework  
 Political ecology is an essential tool for studying social movements given that it helps one 
to understand how power structures both facilitate environmental degradation and provide 
momentum for local mobilization. It also informs how one understands the various scales of 
power within which COMARU operates to enact change. In my discussion of political ecology 
and its applications to the social movement COMARU is constructing, I will adhere most closely 
to Peet and Watts’ definition of political ecology.  They define it as a “confluence between 
ecologically rooted social science and the principles of political economy” and envision 
“possibilities for broadening environmental issues into a movement for livelihood entitlements, 
and social justice” (Peet and Watts, 1996b, pp. 38-9).  
 In my discussion of the impacts of the Camisea Project and COMARU’s subsequent 
organizing of Machiguenga communities, I will refer to the environmental identity and social 
thesis, which says that environmental conditions create opportunities for local groups to define 
and represent themselves politically (Robbins 2004). Robbins distinguishes this branch of 
political ecology as being heavily focused on sociology, focusing on cultural networks and 
political system upheavals.  
 Social movement theory is also critical to understanding the politicization of COMARU’s 
strategies.  Bebbington refers to social movements as “vehicles through which the concerns of 
poor and marginalized groups are given greater visibility within civil society” (Bebbington et al., 
2008,p. 2888) They rest upon the formation of a collective identity, and often unite individuals 
who encompass a variety of diversities apart from class, such as gender, ethnicity and race 
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(Moore 1998; Dirlik and Prazniak 2001).  Using social network theory, I will explain how 
COMARU can contemporarily be understood as a social movement organization rather than 
simply a representative entity, utilizing an aggressive campaign to fight for Machiguenga rights. 
 Finally, Paulo Freire’s Pedagogy of the Oppressed provides an important framework for 
which to understand power dynamics between Machiguenga communities oppressed by the 
impacts of the Camisea Project and the state and extractive companies. Freire defines the 
oppressed as those who are “prevented from being fully human” (Freire, 1982,p. 42) and their 
oppressors as those who abuse their power towards violence, possessiveness and depreciation of 
the oppressed.  It is important that the oppressed abandon their belief in the invulnerability of the 
oppressor because they are the only ones who can liberate themselves and their oppressor. Freire 
stresses that is essential that the oppressed be the main actors in their liberation process. 
Otherwise they will be involved in ‘pseudo-participation’, not ‘committed involvement’” (p. 56). 
Genuine participation of the oppressed in their liberation can only come from equal collaboration 
with any entity that may assist them with their liberation in addition to “a permanent relationship 
of dialogue with the oppressed” (p. 55).  
 COMARU plays a key role in facilitating the liberation of Machiguenga communities 
from their oppression, and through this role they act as a “change agent” (Burkey 1993). Change 
agents serve as a link between local communities and powerholders and “give legitimacy to 
groups before they have acquired strength and acceptance on their own” (Burkey, 1993, p.173). 
This paper will analyze how well COMARU carries out that role of “change agent”.  
Background on the Camisea Project 
 Natural gas was first discovered in the South Eastern Peruvian Amazon in 1978, but it 
wasn’t extracted until August of 2004 with the initiation of the Camisea Project (Earle and Pratt 
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2009). In this year, two pipelines were constructed starting from Camisea’s gas fields in the 
Amazon stretching all the way across the Andes to Lima on the coast.   Peru’s Camisea natural 
gas project is a  $1.6 billion project, $75 million of it funded through a direct loan from the IDB 
(Hearn 2007).  The project has been marketed as a key development strategy through its potential 
to transform Peru into a net energy exporter, attracting many multinational extractive companies. 
However, the state and energy companies show a lack of concern over the projects adverse 
impacts on the health and livelihoods of the Machiguenga native communities who live in and 
around the sites where gas extraction and transportation take place.  
 Five ruptures have occurred in the pipeline transporting natural gas liquids from Camisea 
to Lima (Hearn 2007).   
       Figure 1 
       Spills along TGP natural gas duct that passes from Camisea in Bajo Urubamba  
                  to Lima.  
 .  
                                  (Vences 2006) 
 
Techint and TGP, two companies involved in pipeline construction, deny the faulty construction 
of the pipe, although a report filed by E-tech found that 40% of the pipes were leftovers from 
other transportation projects, they were heavily corroded, and the welders lacked certification 
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(Hearn 2007). These spills have directly contaminated Machiguenga water supplies, leading to 
extremely adverse health, environmental and cultural impacts within the communities. 
Background on Machiguengas 
 The ethnicity of the members of the communities that are being impacted extraction and 
transportation processes of the Camisea Project is Machiguenga. Machiguengas are traditionally 
primarily characterized as shy people, their goal to “minimize contact with the larger world 
rather than to confront and try to control it” (Johnson, 2003, p. 11). For this reason, 
Machiguengas have settled in relatively isolated areas, even though the fish and game animals 
tend to be scarce where they have settled.  Machiguengas fish for trout and hunt monkeys, tapir, 
parrots, deer, spectacled bear, anteaters, depending on the elevation (Johnson 2003). Since the 
ruptures in TGP’s pipeline and the resulting water contamination, it has been increasingly 
difficult to find fish and animals and at times have to rely on canned sardines and rice to 
supplement their diet.  
 Despite the popular notion the individualism is a strictly Western concept, Machiguengas 
are extremely individualistic and resent outside intrusions. This individualism is one of the main 
reasons they exist in low population densities and their settlements are very dispersed (Johnson 
2003). It also rationalizes the resentment Machiguengas feel towards the presence of energy 
company and TGP workers in their communities.  
 Despite the resentment worker presences ignite, several Machiguenga characteristics 
provide barriers to collective action. First, Machiguenga community ties normally extend no 
further than the family unit.  Both their highly dispersed settlements and individualistic attitudes 
prevent them from coming together regularly for anything other than fishing (Johnson 2003).  
Rosengren argues that “it is only in times of perceived external threat that individuals come 
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together to co-operate” (as cited in Earle and Pratt, 2009, p. 12). Second, voicing concerns is not 
something Machiguengas feel comfortable doing; their voices are typically extremely soft. 
Manners are highly valued and they usually repress their anger through grudges rather than 
outwardly demonstrating it (Johnson, 2003).  
 Machiguengas, although their culture is quickly changing, are often viewed in urban 
regions in Peru as backwards, uneducated and savage. The word chunchos, which means “wild 
ones” in Quechua, is sometimes used in reference to Amazonian peoples (Rénique, 2009, p. 
118).  In contrast to indigenous peoples in the Andes, who are simultaneously marginalized but 
are considered “reputed inheritors of a romanticized imperial civilization” (p. 118), Amazonian 
peoples are viewed more as uncivilized savages who choose to separate themselves from the 
dominant culture in Peru.  Natalie Smith comments on an expectation for Machiguengas “to 
work together as an ethnic group in the aggressive protection of their territory and traditional 
livelihoods,” and to, “assign a type of primordial role to indigenous peoples” (as cited in Earle, 
2009, p. 705).  
 Another common stereotype about Machiguengas is that they are inherently linked to the 
environment. On the other end of the spectrum, I have also encountered the belief that because 
Machiguengas experience low levels of education, they should not have the power to manage 
their own land. A civil engineer from Cusco, Peru said:  
 “Because they (Machiguengas) have little formal education, they don’t understand 
 what  the environment is.  They live simply as part of the environment, but they  don’t 
 know the importance of the environment.”  (civil engineer, personal interview, May 2, 
 2010). 
 
This quote reflects a common sentiment that rests within Peruvian urban culture, that 
Amazonians are uneducated and weak.  
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 Alan García, Peru’s current president, has said, “These people don’t have crowns.  They 
aren’t first-class citizens who can say…’You [the government] don’t have the right to be here.’ 
No way.”  García went on to call indigenous protesters “pseudo-indigenous” and accused 
indigenous leaders of a protest in Bagua of terrorism (Rénique, 2009, p. 121).  
The Camisea Project: Impacts on Machiguenga Health, Environment and 
Culture  
  
Local Perceptions in Monte Carmelo, Korimani, Shimaa, Chakopishiato, and Inkaare 
 
 In order to comprehend COMARU’s motivations for organizing Alto and Bajo 
Urubamba, it is important to understand the incredibly adverse impacts these communities 
experience due to the Camisea Project.  The quotes cited below come from five communities in 
Alto Urubamba, which the natural gas pipeline crosses through. However, these interviews 
represent only a small sampling of the health, environmental and cultural impacts the project has 
on native Amazonian communities.  
 I interviewed community members about perceptions of the Camisea Project’s impacts in 
five Alto Urubamba communities: Monte Carmelo, Korimani, Chakopishiato, Shimaa, and 
Inkaare.  Alto Urubamba lies in the Province of La Convención, which is in the region of Cusco.  
Community members in all five communities are Machiguenga and most speak Machiguenga as 
their first language and Spanish as their second. Families live very dispersed within the 
community.  Health resources in each community were lacking: none of them had a health post 
and only Shimaa had a health care provider, who was deemed a promotor de salud.  
 While reactions towards the project varied slightly in each community, perceptions of the 
Camisea Project were overwhelmingly negative. Interviews with informants reflected a deep 
concern towards the project’s impacts on human health, fish and wildlife populations, and the 
survival of Machiguenga cultural tradition.  Most of these impacts are directly or indirectly 
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related to water contamination caused by various ruptures in the gas duct that transports gas from 
Camisea to Lima (Johnson 2005).  In addition to recognizing the negative impacts of the project, 
community members verbalized the urgent need for assistance from COMARU to help solve 
these problems.   
 
   Figure 2: 
   The first TGP gas duct in relation to the five communities studied in Alto  
   Urubamba 
 
            (COMARU) 
Impacts that appear to be the most profound for the communities are the death of fish and 
animals that they depend on for food due to natural gas contamination in their major water 
sources. This has led to a profound state of malnutrition. Another commonly voiced impact was 
the increased presence of illnesses such as nausea, vomiting and fever, which is probably also 
due to contamination of drinking water.  
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. Machiguengas in these communities conceptualize environmental and health impacts of 
the project in terms of how they effect their wellbeing and livelihoods, but also through a cultural 
lens. This quote is from Jorge Kategari, assistant to the chief of Monte Carmelo, in response to a 
question regarding his memories of the community when he was younger, before the initiation of 
the Camisea Project in 2004.  
 “There wasn’t immigration of the colonists to this zone. The majority were 
 Machiguengas.  So, because there were small numbers of colonists in this zone and 
 also few Machiguenga inhabitants, there was an abundance of fish, an abundance of wild 
 animals that we ate as food.  Also, there was a lot of timber, medicinal plants, and 
 also in relation to our culture, we had it almost intact. We practiced our cultural 
 identity. We still had  to use our own dress which is the cusma, we used arrows, we used 
 instruments to hunt the animals in the forests…almost everything was natural.1 (Jorge 
 Kategari, personal interview” April 16, 2010). 
 
 Andrés Mamanki, the ex-Chief of Korimani, expressed a similar sentiment towards 
“colonos”, presumably TGP workers, who enter the communities.  He said, “Now we are 
becoming civilized.  Many colonists come, the civilizations.  We’re losing our culture” (Andrés 
Mamanki, personal interview, April 16, 2010).  This concern regarding cultural change as a 
result of the presence of TGP workers was an urgent concern for community members. Their use 
of the term colonos, or colonists, when referring to them highlights their sentiments of feeling 
colonized. This metaphor was present throughout interviews with COMARU as well. The 
president of COMARU, Rubén Miguel Binari Piñarreal, said, “With the presence of the 
companies there is a massive influx of people from the exterior making the communities lose 
their culture,” and “Before, we lived in Alto and Bajo Urubamba in a paradise when there were 
no roads. It was pure, Everything was beautiful. There were animals, There were monkeys.  Now 
there aren’t. Now, colonization comes.” (Rubén Miguel Binari Piñarreal, personal interview, 
April 16, 2010). 
                                                 
1
 Unless otherwise noted, all translations from Spanish to English were carried out by the author.  
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 Adverse health effects from water contamination were another repeatedly mentioned 
concern. According to Mamanki, Korimani is suffering from, “yellow fever, tuberculosis, 
diarrhea and parasites.” Once again, perceptions of COMARU leaders mirrored that of 
community members. Plinio said, “Now you don’t see clean water, just muddy water. This at the 
same time kills fish and also, for example, another product of this is that the community 
members have to drink this.  This also generates diseases: parasites or other illnesses with the 
digestive system” (Plinio Kategari Kashiari, personal interview, April 27, 2010). Additionally, 
Rubén spoke of rapid transmission of STDs from workers to community members due to the 
lack of preparedness of their immune systems.  Rúben spoke of at least three communities in 
Bajo Urubamba in which cases of HIV/AIDS have been reported, and he says Peru’s Ministry of 
Health has not initiated any educational programs to prevent further transmission.  Rúben also 
mentioned the rise in alcoholism in the communities because workers make it more accessible 
(Rubén Miguel Binari Piñarreal, personal interview, April 16, 2010).  
 The only health care provider in any of the communities was Alfredo Capa in Shimaa.  
He provided me with information regarding new emerging illnesses in the community since the 
construction of  TGP’s natural gas duct, which he says runs about a kilometer from Shimaa’s 
school.  Shimaa lies between two rivers, the Río Shimaa and the Río Kompiroshiatov (Johnson, 
2003, p. 23), and these drinking water sources have been contaminated by natural gas from a 
rupture in the pipeline.  In order to obtain medicine for the community, Capa ziplines across a 
river to Kepashiato, the closest community with a health post, where he buys medication for the 
community with his own money. Alfredo says that there are now more cases of leg infections 
and intestinal infections now that the gasduct passes through the community.  Another 
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devastating new illness that has begun to afflict pregnant women in the community, according to 
Alfredo, is uterine cancer. (Alfredo Capa, personal interview, April 18, 2010) 
 Mamanki expressed the fact that these impacts establish a great need for COMARU to 
represent the communities.  He said, “If we are not going to do these things, (collaborate with 
COMARU), who is going to help us?  Who is going to defend us?  There is no one who can save 
us.” (Andrés Mamanki, personal interview, April 16, 2010).  In the following sections, I will 
discuss the strategies COMARU uses to attract national and international attention to these grave 
injustices native Amazonian communities are experiencing due to the Camisea Project. 
Additionally, I will evaluate the success of COMARU’s strategies to achieve compensation from 
extractive companies and to promote state political accountability.  
Organizational Structure of COMARU 
 COMARU (Consejo Machiguenga del Rio Urubamba) has evolved to become the most 
active and influential organization in the Camisea region despite its small leadership base and 
limited financial resources (Earle and Pratt 2009).   As a non-profit founded in 1991, its primary 
stated objective is to protect the wellbeing of the 30 native communities with whom they affiliate 
and represent.  Eighteen of these communities are situated in Alto Urubamba and twelve in Bajo 
Urubamba (Earle and Pratt 2009).  While other organizations such as AIDESEP (National 
Organization of the Amazon Indigenous People of Peru) and CEDIA (Center for Indigenous 
Amazonian Development) also work for Amazonian indigenous rights in the face of the Camisea 
Project, COMARU undoubtedly works the most intimately with indigenous communities 
impacted by extraction in the Camisea gas fields. Nevertheless, COMARU gains some of its 
political legitimacy through collaborating with those groups, because as Burkey notes, small, 
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isolated groups have limited power when they do not team up with like-minded groups (Burkey 
1993).  
 While COMARU has an extensive agenda, including improving community education 
and full registration of all Machiguenga territories, its most all-encompassing and urgent goal is 
one that was outlined in a 2004 meeting between COMARU representatives and delegates from 
all of COMARU’s affiliated communities: “Ensure the full realization of indigenous rights to 
ancestral lands, as well as to autonomy, indigenous self-determination and jurisdiction, economic 
development with identity, and culturally appropriate education and health, as set out in national 
Law and Convention 169 of the ILO” (Earle and Pratt, 2009, p.10). 
  Due to the mistrust members of COMARU’s affiliated communities hold towards larger 
international NGO’s and white individuals who are deemed ‘colonos’, COMARU is made up 
solely of Machiguengas.  They believe this is the only way in which they the organization can 
truly understand and represent the voices of their affiliate communities. Because COMARU 
leaders were born in the same communities they represent, they have extremely intimate ties to 
them.  
 Earle and Pratt (2009) describe how, although COMARU was founded originally for the 
purpose of representing its affiliated indigenous communities, “it has begun to adopt protest 
strategies and mobilize collective activities that are drawn from the strategic repertoire of social 
movements, specifically protest marches, blockades and boycotts (p. 24).  While COMARU has 
indeed made this transition, it maintains its representative role. In this role, it serves as an 
intermediary, channeling demands of the communities to the Peruvian state and the companies. 
Within this intermediary role, COMARU uses its authority to translate the needs and concerns of 
the communities they represent, in addition to the needs of any other native community within its 
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geographical range that requests assistance, into language that larger structural entities will pay 
heed to.   
 However, as companies have consistently gone against their own codes of conduct in 
dealing with communities and ruptures in the gas pipeline have led to significant impacts in 
indigenous livelihoods (Earle and Pratt 2009) “COMARU has had to bring the demands and 
problems of the Machiguenga, who have been all but excluded from the polity since the creation 
of the Peruvian state, into the public consciousness and the political arena” (p.25). Through 
protests, establishment of blockades, and direct confrontations with Peru’s armed forces, 
COMARU has politicized its activities and image and evolved into a considerably more 
aggressive defender of Machiguenga rights.  
 So far, this paper has laid out the adverse impacts Machiguenga communities in the 
Southeast Peruvian Amazon experience due to the Camisea Project and emphasizes their need 
for support in achieving their rights. In the following sections, I will analyze how well the 
infrastructure and strategies of COMARU set the organization up for success as a change agent 
for the Machiguengas.  
Evaluation of COMARU’s Success as a Change Agent 
 In order to evaluate the success of COMARU’s efforts to act as a successful change agent 
on behalf of the thirty communities that they represent in the Urubamba I will use four primary 
criteria referred to earlier:   
 1. How well does COMARU genuinely amplify the true needs and wishes of their      
     thirty affiliated communities?  
 2. Does COMARU help to establish a collective Machiguenga identity, which is        
     essential for collective action to occur?  
 3. Does COMARU demonstrate negotiating power through their ability to procure         
     compensation for the communities from the state, municipality, and extractive               
     companies?  
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 3. Does COMARU hold the state accountable for complying with indigenous       
     rights laws, the ILO’s Convention 169 in particular through the use of        
     politicized tactics (strikes, protests, roadblocks, etc.)?  
 
I. Genuine Representation of the Communities  
 COMARU prides itself upon its intimate collaboration with the communities it serves in 
order to facilitate a development that reflects their needs. In an interview with Anibal Kategari, 
the environmental technician from ProNaturaleza through the program PMAC (Programa de 
Monitoreo Ambiental Comunitario), he said “COMARU is born of the communities.  Whatever 
decision, they make in the communities…the communities are the base that decides every 
decision” (Anibal Kategari, personal interview, April 13, 2010).  Similarly, Plinio, Kategari 
Kashiari, Co-leader of COMARU, stated, “Meetings between chiefs of the communities, this is 
what dominates the assembly in general.  They are the ones who make decisions, not 
COMARU…they decide what it is that COMARU is going to do.  This is the most important 
decision of COMARU” (Plinio Kategari Kashiari, personal interview, April 27, 2010).  In this 
section I will analyze to what degree COMARU accurately amplifies the needs of its affiliated 
communities.  
 One of the primary ways in which COMARU takes stock of the needs of the 
communities is by regularly traveling to each one to hold meetings with community leaders and 
members. Usually about five hours long, the meetings are conducted in Machiguenga so that all 
members, including ones who do not speak Spanish very well, may participate. Understandably, 
COMARU’s limited financial resources from its primary source of funding, Oxfam America, 
(Earle and Pratt 2009) and the substantial distance between COMARU’s office in Quillabamba 
and the communities prevent COMARU from making community visits more than two or three 
times per year.  However infrequent, these meetings are essential tools in developing 
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COMARU’s understanding of the health, environmental and concerns of the communities in 
addition to communication the communities’ rights to them. In other words, an invaluable 
dialogue and trust is forged between COMARU and the communities at these meetings. After 
listening to community concerns at meetings, COMARU uses meeting information about 
community needs to persuade the municipality Echarate, extractive companies and the state to 
implement projects such as the construction of schools.  
 During community meetings, leaders from COMARU sit at the front of the room in front 
of the Jefe of the community and other community members. These are two separate agendas 
Plinio, the co-leader of COMARU wrote on the board in Inkaare and Chakopishiato: 
Meeting Agenda2   Community Development Plan3 
1.Alto Lagunas Road4     1. Education 
 -passage of vehicles     2. Health 
 -falsification of signatures   3. Land and Resources 
2. Communication Radio    4. Culture 
3. Educational Institution    5. Community organization    
4. No participation of young people  
in community’s activities 
5. Community organization   
 
COMARU addresses problems specific to each community such as the construction of the Alto 
Lagunas road in Inkaare and the passage of the TGP natural gas duct through Shimaa. In 
Korimani, during my trip with COMARU, a heated argument over territory rights broke out 
between community members, and COMARU used a map to determine who should hold 
territory rights.  While COMARU deals with these specific problems in each community, they 
commonly addressed these themes in every community: education, maintenance of culture in the 
face of the Camisea Project, health issues afflicting the communities due to water contamination 
                                                 
2
 Meeting agenda from Inkaare 
3
 Community development plan from community meeting in Chakopishiato 
4
 Alto Lagunas is a newly constructed road in Inkaare 
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from the pipeline ruptures, and strengthening community organization.  COMARU greatly 
stressed community cooperation and said to Inkaare: “the most important thing is to not be 
divided.”  
 Community member participation in the meetings varied greatly.  In Korimani, 
community members were extremely timid, therefore COMARU and the ex-leader of the 
community, Andrés Mamanki did the majority of the talking.  In Chakopishiato and Inkaare, 
where Plinio asked community members to voice their desires for the communities, they 
willingly did so. Inkaare community members wanted a person to give doses of medicine, a radio 
to be able to report accidents, to be able to call ambulances in Kiteni, medicine because they are 
seven hours from a health post, and better transportation. Shimaa residents participated by far the 
most out of the five communities I visited. The health promoter, teacher and chief of the 
community all individually stood up and spoke of wishes they had for the community.  Despite 
variations in levels of community participation, extremely high turnouts at each meeting 
demonstrated each community’s trust in COMARU and investment in the promotion of their 
rights.  
 It is clear that community members view meetings with COMARU as an essential 
strategy of communicating their concerns surrounding the Camisea Project and other community 
problems. While they occur infrequently due to funding limitation, they make COMARU unique 
in that they insure that community members have a voice in what local development projects are 
pursued.  This strategy allows COMARU to relate more intimately with the communities than 
INGO’s, whom have in the past used poor communication methods. According to Pratt (2007), 
when international and local NGOs have attempted to engage with Machiguenga, they have used 
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large workshops, which didn’t resonate with locals. Overall, they seemed to be more driven by 
their own agendas rather than by the true needs of the Machiguengas.  
 
 
II. Development of a Collective Identity  
 One of the primary goals of COMARU is to protect and strengthen Machiguenga identity 
in the face of unwanted development (COMARU 2009).  COMARU recognizes that, despite the 
heterogeneity of the communities it represents, the creation of a collective identity is the only 
way Machiguengas can successfully battle Camisea. Whittier (2002) recognizes this necessity as 
such:  
Even movements that organize around collectivities that are recognized and legitimized 
by the dominant culture…must nevertheless construct collective experience: who the 
group are, what their attributes are, what they have in common, how they are different 
from other groups, and what the political significance of all this is (as cited in Earle, 
2009, p. 710)   
 
Social networks such as COMARU are important in shaping such a collective identity because 
they facilitate the solidification of identities “with a specific political contention (Passy 2003; 
cited in Earle 2009). COMARU, through it’s media discourse, has promoted the popular notion 
that Machiguengas are intrinsically connected to nature, and by doing so, have shaped their 
collective identity through the lens of this historically popular stereotype. In this section, I will 
analyze to what extent COMARU perpetuates the stereotype of the “noble savage” for the sake 
of forming a collective identity and also to what extent COMARU permits the Machiguengas 
they represent to participate in the process of their own liberation.    
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 Earlier, I discussed Freire’s theory of the pedagogy of the oppressed (1970), which says 
that oppressed groups must adopt an active role in the process of their own liberation. He says, 
“While no one liberates himself by his own efforts alone, neither is he liberated by others” 
(p.53). Using this ideological framework, the Machiguenga communities can be thought of as the 
oppressed who are marginalized by their oppressors, the Peruvian government and extractive 
companies. Burkey (1993) promotes the concept of participatory development as a way of 
ensuring that local groups have a voice in their own development, which mirrors Freir’s 
argument.  While the change agent, in this case COMARU, may serve as an intermediary 
between locals and larger power-holders, an effective development approach must be rooted in 
grassroots efforts (Burkey, 1993, p. 166). 
 COMARU recognizes that it is important for the communities they represent to take an 
active role in their liberation and that this is achieved by improving Machiguenga confidence. 
Only when they overcome a lack of confidence in themselves can they rid themselves of their 
“diffuse, magical belief in the invulnerability and the power of the oppressor” (Freire, 1982, p. 
50) and begin to participate in their struggle for liberation.  In an interview with Plinio, he 
commented on how happy he felt when a community member said, “Here I am! Here I am!” 
upon seeing himself in a picture of a strike on a COMARU t-shirt. Therefore, the strikes and 
protests which COMARU have increasingly relied upon effectively contribute to a collective 
Machiguenga identity, despite their dispersed geographic origins. The anniversary party 
COMARU threw in Quillabamba soon after our trip to Alto Urubamba also served as a means of 
fostering collective identity and Machiguenga pride. There, community members from both Bajo 
and Alto Urubamba participated in celebrations of Machiguenga culture through dance and 
singing performances.  
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 In its efforts to establish a collective identity, however, COMARU sometimes serves to 
erroneously homogenize the Machiguenga identity and to perpetuate popular stereotypes of 
natives inherently living in harmony with their environment.  Plinio, in an interview, said that, 
“By nature the Machiguenga has always characterized himself to be a conservationist, to live 
with nature”, and “They say that the native, the Machiguenga, without resources or without the 
environment, isn’t a native, isn’t a person” (Plinio, personal interview, April 27, 2010). In 
COMARU’s 2009 bulletin that lists the goals and projects of the organization, COMARU refers 
to “the extractive gas companies, who have created a disequilibrium in the habitat of our 
indigenous brothers” which assumes that Machiguengas naturally live in an equilibrium state 
with nature (COMARU 2009). 
 Earle (2009) says that by stressing this harmonious relationship, COMARU is most likely 
attempting to appeal to Western notions of Amazonian indigenous identity, which generally 
assumes a harmonious bond between indigenous peoples and nature. However, shared 
geographical origins does not mean that all Machiguuenga have the same needs and attitudes.  
The perpetuation of this stereotype leads to the creation of an “imagined community” (cited in 
Earle, 2009, p. 707).  
  Another potential result of COMARU’s identity work is their establishment of an ‘Us 
versus them’ mentality (Bruijn, 2010, p. 487) in which the Machiguenga begin to envision 
themselves as caretakers of the environment and the Peruvian state and extractive companies as 
evil representatives of modernization (p. 487). While this dichotomy is oversimplified, and 
COMARU recognizes this oversimplification, they support this dichotomy in order to foster a 
collective identity based upon anger towards their oppressors. This anger prompts the 
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communities to band together and pursue collective action through strikes and protests which 
will be discussed more in-depth later. 
III. Effectiveness of Depoliticized Tactics  
 
 In the following two sections, I will analyze the effectiveness of COMARU’s 
organizational strategies, both politicized and depoliticized. As previously mentioned, 
COMARU has made a tangible shift from acting primarily as a representative organization 
towards a social movement organization. However, as noted by Earle, COMARU “is still at root 
a representative organization…it was not founded to protest against the work of energy 
companies (Earle 2009). COMARU’s members function as intermediaries between the 
communities, state, municipality, and extractive companies, translating cultural and linguistic 
differences to achieve favorable outcomes for the communities. Through this role, leaders of 
COMARU serve as change agents, “giving legitimacy to groups before they have acquired 
strength and acceptance on their own” (Burkey 1993).  
 One of the defining characteristics of a change agent, according to Burkey, is their 
“working directly with small groups (to) provide a vital link between the groups and local 
officials” (Burkey, 1982, p. 173) COMARU demonstrated their negotiating power and ability to 
provide that link when denouncing the architect of a school that was to be built in the community 
of Chakopishiato by the district municipality, Echarate.  The architect appeared, unannounced at 
the community meeting between COMARU and the communities, and a leader of COMARU 
denounced the blueprints he was carrying in front of the entire community.  He said that the 
school was so small that “not fit for a chorale of rabbits”, let alone children.  The community 
watched in awe as they saw COMARU standing up for them and their childrens’ educations in 
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front of their own eyes. This incident represents COMARU’s power to negotiate on behalf of the 
communities with powerholders.  
 COMARU’s decisions regarding the 2004 public hearing to discuss the development of 
Block 56, a new energy concession, provides a second example of COMARU playing out its role 
as an intermediary in negotiations. Through this example, we begin to witness COMARU’s 
adoption of tactics typical of a social movement organization. Finally, it reveals criticisms from 
NGOs towards COMARU’s willingness to compromise with extractive companies. The hearing 
was to be held in January of 2005, but after the pipeline leading from Block 88, the first energy 
concession, ruptured, COMARU decided not to attend the hearing. This decision was an 
important strategic move because the development of the concession depended on the approval 
of an Environmental Impact Assessment, which would take place at the public hearing. They 
would not allow the hearing to take place, they decided, until their eight demands, or “ocho 
puntos” had been met. Amongst the top priorities were:  
 1. Clarification of the cause of the spill. 
 2. An inspection of the whole route of the gas pipeline 
 3. An environmental audit of Block 88’s activities and the pipeline 
 4. Repair of damage to affected communities (Earle 2009)  
 
Company and state representatives did not respond to the eight demands, so COMARU came to 
the public hearing banging oil drums and shouting “Pagoreni won’t be sold, the Machiguenga 
will defend it” (Earle and Pratt, 2009, p. 704). However, when leaders of CECONAMA and 
COMARU were invited to hold a meeting with the extractive companies at their headquarters, 
they agreed to hold a public hearing on May 10th. Some communities were too upset to attend the 
hearing. COMARU, however, stood by its decision, believing that a failure to cooperate with the 
companies could lead to a forfeiting of compensation and resources from the companies (Earle 
2009).  
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 Activist NGOs who believe indigenous groups should not give extractive companies any 
access to their territories labeled COMARU’s agreement to hold the public hearing as a failure of 
their negotiations and protest efforts. However, COMARU recognizes that extraction is going to 
continue in Peru and that it is necessary to hedge your bets when negotiating with extractive 
companies. Burkey (1993) speaks of the need for change agents to encourage positive 
relationships between the local groups with whom they work and local officials because 
extended conflict will eventually destroy a participatory movement (p. 170).  Cohen admits that 
this “implies acceptance of certain rules of social interaction viewed as legitimate, at least 
temporarily” (as cited in Burkey, 1993, p. 170). With these ideas in mind, COMARU recognizes 
that while they don’t agree with many actions of the energy companies it is necessary to maintain 
relatively positive relations with them in order to maintain compensation.   
 When COMARU, the Peru office of UK WWF and two other Peruvian indigenous 
organizations, CECONAMA and FECONAYY negotiated with the company Shell, they were 
again highly criticized. Through these negotiations, however, Shell agreed to self-contain Shell 
workers’ camps to minimize worker-community interactions and to not extract in Manu National 
Park, among other things (Earle 2009). COMARU, CECONAMA and FECONAYY leaders said 
they were willing to negotiate with Shell because they were more reasonable than other energy 
companies would have likely been. 
 Clearly, COMARU’s relationship with energy companies is both positive and negative as 
they strive to hold them accountable but also to sustain company compensation and positive 
negotiations.  Johnson calls this dual relationship a testament of COMARU’s being a “central 
source of legitimate representation” (Johnson 2005) because COMARU continues to “position 
themselves as a thorn in the companies’ side”. According to the ex-president of COMARU, 
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“We’re not bothering them so they leave, but so they improve” (Johnson 2005). This 
contradictory relationship with the companies permeates many of COMARU’s activities: in the 
communities, they hold meetings to organize against the energy companies in buildings 
constructed by TGP, travel from community to community in a truck with a TGP logo on the 
side, and watched Avatar with Monte Carmelo community members on a projector purchased by 
TGP. Therefore, COMARU cunningly exploits company resources to organize against them. 
 While COMARU has effectively exploited its relationship with energy companies, the 
organization feels negotiations with the state and the current president, Alan García, are 
somewhat futile.  According to the president, Rúben Miguel Binari Piñarreal, “With this Alan 
Garcia we aren’t going to have clear dialogue.  We’re waiting for the government to change.” He 
says indigenous communities should pressure the U.S. to tell Alan Garciá “You’re not handling 
the oil companies, and it’s tremendous abuse” (Rubén, personal interview, April 16, 2010).  
Through the Ley de Promoción de la Inversion en La Amazonia (Ley 27037), the Peruvian 
government promises to promote development in the Amazon through implementing projects to 
improve, health, education, and nutrition. Rubén says that none of these promises have come to 
fruition in the communities.  According to him, “In Peru, democracy is not like they say it is. The 
center is Lima…the state doesn’t invest like it says it does for the communities, but it invests in 
bridges, in projects, in other things. But here in the communities we don’t see that reality, there 
isn’t development.”  
 Despite the state’s negligence towards development in Amazonian native communities, 
they are the ones who should be developing such health and education projects. In regards to this 
sentiment, Plinio commented, “The one who should develop solutions is the central Peruvian 
government. Although they have considered us third class citizens, we are born of Peruvian 
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territory and we have every right to be attended by the state in education, health and sustainable 
development in every one of the communities” (Plinio, personal interview, April 27 2010). 
COMARU’s vehemently believes that the state will continue to neglect its promise of promoting 
sustainable development in the Amazon if drastic changes aren’t made. Therefore, they have 
transitioned away from being solely a representative organization towards a social movement 
organization, using more aggressive tactics in hopes of finally getting state and international 
attention. In the next section, I will discuss whether or not COMARU is successful in gaining 
attention and influencing policy through these highly politicized actions.  
IV. Effectiveness of COMARU’s Politicized Tactics – Do They Lead to Political Change?   
 
 Political ecology is an especially useful lens when thinking about COMARU as a social 
movement organization because it explains how COMARU, a “meso-level” organization 
“mibro-mobilizes” communities in order to combat top-down  environmental change imposed on 
communities by the state and extractive companies (McAdam et al. 1988; Tilly 2004). 
COMARU is a meso-level organization because its actions take place at some level intermediate 
between the macro and micro” (as cited in Staggenborg 2002).  COMARU, whose activism is 
based upon “informal friendship networks”, as McAdams says many collective action is, has 
begun to utilize tactics characteristic of social movement organizations (SMOs), such as 
protesting striking and blocking companies’ access to roads.  Two important characteristics of 
professional social movements, according to McCarthy and Zald, are attempting to impart the 
image of ‘speaking for a potential constituency’ and influencing policy toward that same 
constituency’, two objectives COMARU prioritizes (McAdams et al. 1988).  
 The environmental degradation wrought by the Camisea Project has prompted the 
development of collective action from Machiguenga communities in the Southeast Peruvian 
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Amazon, facilitated by COMARU as the change agent. This phenomenon reflects the 
“environmental identity and social movement thesis”, which says that “changes in environmental 
management regimes and environmental conditions have created opportunities or imperatives for 
local groups to secure and represent themselves politically” (Robbins 2004). Machiguengas’ 
frustration and the opportunity to mobilize with the support of COMARU was the “critical 
event” (Staggenborg 2002) that prompted them to abandon their traditional individualistic values 
to fight for political change.  
 Another significant change signaled by this organizational shift is the communities’ 
ability to participate in the process of their own liberation. When COMARU functioned strictly 
as a representative organization, the communities were virtually excluded from the negotiation 
process. This exclusion, according to Freire, prevents them from achieving true liberation and, in 
fact, deepens their oppressed state. In his words, “Those who work for liberation must not take 
advantage of the emotional dependence of the oppressed…using their dependence to create still 
greater dependence is an oppressor tactic” (Freire, 1982, p. 53).  Now that COMARU organizes 
strikes and protests which itilize, and in fact, require, the participation of the Machiguenga 
communities, they may now participate in the process of their own liberation. 
 The central law for which COMARU is attempting to hold the state accountable is Article 
15 of the International Labor Organization’s Convention 169. By becoming a signatory to 
Convention 169, the Peruvian state has an obligation to give native communities the right to 
“consultation, participation, and decision” in any development projects that could potentially 
affect their well-being. They also must ensure affected people will experience benefits of the 
extraction and be paid compensation for damages from the extraction process. (Smith 2005). 
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COMARU feels that these “rights that the Peruvian government has accepted as law are not 
being applied in Peru” (Plinio, personal interview, April 27, 2010).  
 Earle cites three instances in 2005 in which COMARU has successfully mobilized 
Machiguenga communities to shed light on inadequate responses towards ruptures in the natural 
gas pipeline (Earle, 2009, p. 26) The first protest activity occurred in response to the previously 
mentioned public hearing to approve the Environmental Impact Assessment for Block 56. They 
shouted slogans, waved banners, and banged on empty oil cylinders in order to draw attention to 
authorities’ apathetic attitude towards the spill. After that hearing was suspended and 
rescheduled, the hearing had to be suspended again when COMARU arranged a boycott (Earle 
2009). While COMARU eventually agreed to hold the hearing in fear of losing compensation 
from the company, it helped COMARU get its feet wet in terms of protesting. The second protest 
occurred after the fourth rupture in the pipeline when COMARU, in conjunction with two other 
indigenous organizations, blockaded a river to prevent the transportation of supplies to Camisea.  
 These protests are significant not only because they attract attention from extractive 
companies, but also because they promote Machiguenga confidence and a collective identity. 
Plinio, the Sub-Jefe of COMARU says, “What’s lacking is the self-esteem in every one of the 
communities. Commenting on a 2009 protest, he said:  
 “One very important aspect is that never in Peru has anyone held a strike for 150 days. 
 But the indigenous have, they’ve done it. It’s a big lesson that the citizens of Peru have 
 received. To show our gratitude to our comrades who have fought, we made t-shirts. It 
 makes me really happy when they say ‘Here I am, here I am, look at the picture!’ With 
 that, they feel valued and that they haven’t fought for nothing, but for a noble cause.” 
 (Plinio, personal interview, April 27, 2010). 
 
  Clearly, politicized actions help COMARU to achieve one of their goals of fostering a 
collective identity and increasing the communities’ confidence in their ability to organize. 
Unfortunately, however, COMARU’s politicized actions have compromised their already small 
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financial pool by sacrificing financial support from INGOs that want to “maintain their 
neutrality” (Earle and Pratt 2009). INGOs completely against negotiating with extractive 
companies criticize COMARU for collaborating with companies while NGOs that require state 
approval of their development work criticize COMARU for their aggressive protests that anger 
the state. According to Pratt, NGO support for COMARU has been minimal, partly because of 
their wanting to maintain their neutrality. While many claim to support the ideals of the 
organization, only one INGO has financially supported its efforts for a significant period of time 
(Pratt 2007).  
 COMARU has amplified its reputation as a social movement organization on an 
international scale through its active participation in protests against the “Law of the Jungle”. 
This package of degrees created by the president, Alan García, open up additional tracts of the 
Amazon to foreign investment, and legal experts say that at least nine of the decrees violate 
Convention 169 (Rénique 2009).  Violent protests involving COMARU and other indigenous 
organizations such as AIDESEP and the Peruvian Jungle Inter-Ethnic Development Association 
against these decrees developed into a popular indigenous uprising between April and June of 
2009. Images of Machiguengas in traditional dress, carrying signs and bows and arrows appeared 
in popular media, in addition to reports of the violent clashes between indigenous groups and 
police.  
 In early June 2009, police fired upon a crowd of indigenous protesters blocking a 
highway led to the oil pipeline in Bagua, in the northern region of the Peruvian Amazon.  The 
New York Times reported the death tolls at twenty-five indigenous people, twenty-two civilians, 
and eleven police offers.  García responded to the events by saying, “We have to understand 
when there are resources like oil, gas and timber, they don’t belong only to the people who had 
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the fortune to be born there, because that would mean more than half of Peru’s territory belongs 
to a few thousand people” (Romero 2009).  
 As a result of these roadblocks, demonstrations, and marches, García’s approval rate 
dropped to below 25% (Rénique 2009). Finally, in June of 2009, Congress annulled decrees 
1015 and 1073, the two considered to be the most offensive (Rénique 2009). This victory was a 
huge success, and proof that mobilization, even when it takes place amongst a group that has 
been historically oppressed can lead to political change.   
Conclusions and Recommendations for COMARU  
 Since the initiation of the Camisea Project, the Peruvian state has treated native 
communities in the Amazon as third-class citizens.  They have ignored their promise to consult 
communities and denied them of essential resources to promote sustainable development within 
the communities. The increasingly adverse impacts of the project have prompted the 
Machiguengas to overcome their traditional shyness and individualistic attitudes to mobilize with 
COMARU for their rights.  
 Community meetings between COMARU and the communities are an essential tool for 
establishing a clear dialogue between the two regarding concerns and desires for their 
communities. COMARU shows a genuine interest in the communities due to their actually being 
from the communities and their physically traveling to the communities to hold these meetings. 
However, these imperative meetings occur infrequently due to time and funding limitations. 
NGOs, on the other hand, generally use tactics such as workshops that don’t foster a relationship 
of trust like the communities have with COMARU. Therefore, COMARU should allocate more 
of their funding towards traveling to communities more than once a year, as they are a critical 
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component of their strategy of legitimate representation and intimate connection with the 
communities.  
 COMARU recognizes that, in order to increase the self-confidence of the communities 
and to build a common foundation for the social movement they are generating, they must work 
towards creating a collective Machiguenga identity. Strikes and cultural celebrations are both 
important strategies to achieving that collective identity. However, in COMARU’s development 
of collective identity, they frequently utilize the ‘noble savage’ stereotype, an oversimplified 
representation of native Amazonian peoples, in order to appeal to Western consciousnesses.  
 While COMARU has successfully adopted strategies typical of a social movement 
organization, it maintains its role as a representative organization--negotiating with the state, 
municipality, and energy companies so they will initiate sustainable development projects in the 
communities. COMARU has demonstrated its ability to successfully serve as an intermediary 
time and time again through achieving compensation for the communities. NGO’s criticize 
COMARU for negotiating too heavily with the companies, but COMARU stands by its company 
negotiations because they recognize they can’t foster a completely adversarial relationship with 
them if they are going to continue to receive compensation.  Given that the communities do not 
currently play a significant role in negotiations, COMARU should make an effort to involve 
them more so that they may participate in the process of their own liberation.  
 While COMARU continues to negotiate with powerholders, an increased sense of 
urgency has prompted the organization to take on strategies more typical of social movement 
organizations (SMOs) such as strikes, roadblocks and protests. The participation of Machiguenga 
community members in these public protests allows Machiguengas to take part in the process of 
their own liberation and attract national and international attention to the demands of COMARU 
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and the indigenous organizations with which it collaborates. These protests have come at the cost 
of the deaths of Machiguengas, civilians and police officers, but in the end, they led to policy 
changes favorable to the Machiguengas. The withdrawal of the two decrees within the “Law of 
the Jungle” occurred partly through COMARU’s banding together with other Peruvian 
indigenous groups, so COMARU should work to maintain and strengthen these coalitions to 
achieve future similar victories.  
 This paper contributes to conversations started by political ecology scholars such as 
Bebbington (2009) and McAdams (1988) due to its reliance upon social network theory, the 
environmental identity and social movement thesis, change agents and collective action. Political 
ecology helps shed light on how unequal power structures can provide a foundation for 
environmental degradation, but in this paper, it also demonstrates how those unequal power 
structures can be navigated and manipulated in the pursuit of justice for a historically 
marginalized population.  COMARU, like every organization that works for human rights in the 
face of unwanted development, displays a few weaknesses within its structure that need to be 
addressed to sustain organizational success.  Nevertheless, COMARU proves to be an incredibly 
unique organization because it has manipulated these unequal power structures in order to 
promote the rights of this population it so genuinely cares for.  
 
Works Cited  
Bebbington, A. (2008). Mining and Social Movements: Struggles Over Liveliohood and Rural 
 Territorial Development in the Andes.  World Development.  35 (12), 2888-2905. 
Bruijn, E. et al. (2010). That Which Doesn’t Break Us: Identity Work by Local Indigenous 
 ‘Stakeholders’. Journal of Business Ethics 96 (479), 495. 
  
33 
33 
Burkey, S. (1993). External Relationships: Inside Looking Out. People First: A Guide to  Self-
 Reliant, Participatory Rural Development (164-179).  London: Zed Books.  
COMARU (2009) Iriniane Mavaintini-La voz del pueblo matsiguenka, Quillabamba: 
 COMARU.  
Dirlik, A. and R. Prazniak. (2001). Introduction: Cultural Identity and the Politics of Place. 
 Places and Politics in an Age of Globalization, ed. R. Prazniak and A. Dirlik, 2-13. 
 Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield.  
Earle, L. (2009). Indigenous protest, social networks, and ethnic stereotyping: some 
 insights from the Peruvian Amazon. Development in Practice 19 (6): 702-713.  
Earle, L., and B. Pratt. (2009). Indigenous social movements and international NGOs in the 
 Peruvian Amazon. International NGO Training and Research Centre.  
Freire, P. (1982). Pedagogy of the Oppressed. New York, NY: The Continuum Publishing 
 Corporation.  
Hearn ,K. (2007). The Camisea Cover-Up. NACLA Report On the Americas. 
Johnson, A. (2003). Families of the Forest: The Matsigenka Indians of the Peruvian Amazon.  
 Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press.    
Johnson, A. (2005). Participation Through the Pipeline: Assessing the Role of Civil Society in 
 Peru’s Camisea Natural Gas Project. Yale School of Forestry & Environmental Studies 1-
 85.  
McAdams, D. et al. (1988). Social movements. In Neil Smelser (Ed.), Handbook of 
 Sociology (695-737). London: Sage. 
Moore, D. (1998). Subaltern Struggles and the Politics of Place: Remapping Resistance in 
 Zimbabwe’s Eastern Highlands. Cultural Anthropology, 13 (3), 344-81. 
  
34 
34 
Peet, R. and M. Watts (1996b). Liberation Ecology: Development, Sustainability, and 
 Environment in the Age of Market Triumphalism. In Liberation Ecologies: 
 Environment, Development, Social Movements (1-45).  New York, Routledge. 
Pratt, B. (2007). Advocacy in the Amazon and the Camisea gas project: implications for non-
 government public action. Development in Practice, 17 (6), 775-783.  
Rénique, G. (2009). Law of the Jungle in Peru: Indigenous Amazonian Uprising  against 
 Neoliberalism. Socialism and Democracy, 23(3), 117-135. 
Robbins, P. (2004). Environmental Identity and Social Movement. In Political Ecology: A 
Critical Introduction (187-201) Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing.  
Romero, S. (2009, June 5). Fatal Clashes Erupt in Peru at Roadblock. The New York Times, pp. 
 A4.  
Smith, R. (2005). Can David and Goliath Have a Happy Marriage? The Machiguenga People and 
 the Camisea Project in the Peruvian Amazon. In P. Brosius (Ed.)  Communities and 
 Conservation: Histories and Politics of Community-Based  Natural Resource 
 Management. (pp. 231-255).  Walnut Creek, CA: AltaMira  Press. 
Staggenborg, S. (2002). The ‘Meso’ in Social Movement Research. In D. Meyer et al. (Ed.), 
 Social Movements: Identity, Culture, and the State. (pp.124-138) New  York, NY: 
 Oxford University Press.   
Tilly, C. 2004. Social Movements, 1768-2004. Boulder, Colorado: Paradigm Publishers. 
Vences, V. (2006). The Camisea Gas Project: A Multi-stakeholder Perspective on  Conflicts & 
 Negotation. Collaboratory for Research on Global Projects.  
 
 
